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Changes to Kenya’s constitution in 2010 on the independence of the judiciary created room for judges to act as guardians of the electoral process. Before this, the law gave Kenya’s
presidents considerable influence over courts’ actions. Historically, the judiciary was not an independent branch. It was categorised as a governmental department working under the authority
of the attorney general. The president was responsible for appointing judges. For instance, Daniel Moi, who was president from 1978 to 2002, systematically appointed loyalists. The close
links between the government and the judiciary made it pointless to go to court to challenge electoral disputes. The 2010 constitution changed this. And in 2017, the Kenyan supreme court,
the highest court in the country, annulled the re-election of the presidential incumbent, Uhuru Kenyatta. The ruling asked the electoral commission to organise a rerun of the presidential
election. This was despite the threats and pressure the judges faced. As a political scientist and former lawyer researching judicial politics in non-democratic settings, I found this change
in behaviour puzzling. In a recent paper, I sought to understand why a court would take such a risk. Where judges face retaliation and pressure from political actors, why – and when – would
courts take the risk of nullifying the elections of ruling party candidates? I found that courts take such risks when there has been institutional reform. But to have this effect, the
reform must meet two conditions. First, a legal framework must shield the judiciary from political interference. It must create distance between the executive and the judiciary branch.
Second, legal reforms must also mobilise judicial activists, lawyers and scholars to train and monitor courts on electoral issues. The Kenyan case illustrates how this works. THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK Kenya’s 2010 constitution put in place mechanisms to shield the judiciary from executive branch interference. First, the judiciary stopped operating under the leadership of the
attorney general, an executive office. This made the separation between the two branches of power official. Second, the constitution removed the president’s prerogative to appoint judges. My
study found that constitutional reforms should not give the executive branch any decision-making power over the functioning and organisation of the judiciary. In Kenya, the Judicial Service
Commission, an independent body established under the constitution in 2010, is responsible for all appointments. Judges go through a rigorous process where their legal skills and personal
ethics are questioned before they are appointed. This process prevents the president from appointing regime supporters. Kenya’s reforms also modified the structure of the judiciary by
creating the supreme court and diluting the authority of the chief justice. A new special fund gave the judiciary financial autonomy. The constitution also contains specific provisions
regulating how the judiciary settles electoral disputes. Before 2010, it took years to settle them. The constitution established a mandatory timeline. Courts have six months to deal with
electoral disputes and 14 days to rule on presidential elections. STRONG JUDICIAL NETWORKS These legal mechanisms are not sufficient on their own. They must create the space for civil
society groups to interact with the judiciary, and encourage collaboration between activists, lawyers and scholars. By teaming up, these groups bring together more resources, expertise and
experience. They can help courts to resist government pressures. In Kenya, I found that these networks of lawyers, activists and scholars used three strategies to empower courts. 1.
STRATEGIC PETITIONS Lawyers, activists and scholars in Kenya have engaged in strategic litigation to improve the quality of election petitions, pushing courts to depart from the old English
precedent, Morgan v Simpson. The 1974 ruling requires plaintiffs to show that electoral fraud occurred, and that the fraudulent behaviour affected an election’s outcome. These Kenyan
networks have given courts the opportunity to change their electoral jurisprudence. In the 2017 presidential election petition filed by Raila Odinga, the supreme court changed its
jurisprudence. It established that petitioners had to prove either that electoral fraud took place, or that these irregularities affected election outcomes. This means plaintiffs don’t need
to meet the two conditions at the same time, making it easier for opposition candidates to win a case. 2. JUDICIAL TRAINING These networks hold training and professionalisation workshops
with the Judiciary Committee on Elections. The sessions help judges to deal with issues such as tight constitutional timelines. They also aim to build a more coherent approach to electoral
petitions and discourage arbitrary decisions. 3. INCREASED SCRUTINY The mobilisation of these networks has put the judiciary under intense scrutiny. They can detect inconsistencies or flawed
legal reasoning in courts’ decisions. This scrutiny has direct effects on courts’ behaviour. Most of the judges I interviewed for my paper remember the atrocities committed following
Kenya’s 2007 election. For many, the judiciary’s inability to settle the electoral dispute effectively plunged the country into violence. More than 1,100 people died. The conflict almost put
the future of judicial institutions into jeopardy. The supreme court knows that any future misstep could threaten the institution’s survival and the country’s political stability. THE
LESSONS Policymakers can draw important lessons from the Kenyan case. First, to prevent political actors from using courts for their own political gain, policymakers must design judicial
institutions that cannot be influenced by the government’s agenda. They should identify all pathways through which governments could influence courts – not only through appointments. Second,
by funding and supporting civil society’s judicial activities, donors can help courts uphold electoral integrity and put states on the path to democratisation.