The populism moment is fading | thearticle

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The defeat for Marine Le Pen in Sunday’s regional elections in France confirms that the new political model is opening up in Europe. It is based on identity not ideology, on interests not


ideas, and on many variants of populism, not a single reductionist populism based on race, nation and hostility to Europe. Twentieth century binary Left-Right politics is dead. The giant


20th century unitary political formations that bestrode the stage in European democracies — Conservatives versus Labour; Social versus Christian Democrats; Socialists versus Gaullists — are


fading away. In the last decade academics like the Dutch Professor Cas Mudde on the Left, or the British Professor Matthew Goodwin on the Right, proclaimed the arrival of an unstoppable


national populist wave that would conquer Europe. It was based on hostility to the EU, hostility to immigrants, and hostility to what came to be called “woke” politics – support for LGBT


rights, for feminism, for anti-racism, or green politics that challenged car-ownership or made roads and public spaces bike or pedestrian friendly. These prophets of populism filled comment


pages with proclamations that Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, Geert Wilders, Viktor Orban and parties like the AfD in Germany, the FPÖ in Austria or Vox in Spain were on the


rise and would soon enter government. Donald Trump and the “Britain Trump” — as the former US President vaingloriously called Boris Johnson after the latter skilfully used Brexit to engineer


his arrival in Downing Street — were seen as the future. But just as 20th century politics has faded, so too have the early 21st century proclamations by both the Right and Left wings of


the intelligentsia that populism was now the only game in town. In France, it is the return of classic post-Gaullist centre-Right politics that did well with big beasts of the Sarkozy era,


but without the sleaze associated with Sarkozy, keeping most control of regional councils. The Left, in the shape of socialist-green alliances, also maintained control of the five regional


councils they held. Macron’s LREM party was not even formed the last time these elections were fought, so had no standard-bearers that voters had got to know. Instead, three heavy-hitting


centre-Right politicians — Xavier Bertrand, Valérie Pecresse and Laurent Wauqiez — now have to decide which of them will be the candidate to challenge Macron next year. They may yet fall out


as none of the three suffers from undue modesty. Marine Le Pen failed to make the self-proclaimed breakthrough she needed. This does not augur well for her chances in the Elysée race next


May. Her hope is that the two-thirds of voters who could not be bothered to turn out to vote on Sunday will have sufficient enthusiasm for her Rassemblement national party to get into the


run-off with Macron. But the spark has gone from her style. In 2016, she seized upon Brexit as the model for France where she, following in her father’s footsteps, had been the champion of


anti-European populism, calling for a rejection of the Euro and a referendum à l’anglaise on the European project. She put Union Jacks on her social media platforms, but as Brexit turned


into a four-year-long political agony for Britain and a steady weakening of the UK economy, she has stopped using the B word as a model to follow. The rampant Francophobia in UK Brexit


circles — with attacks on France over fishing, vaccinations, or Macron’s European grandstanding — are not making any impact in France where there is low-level Schadenfreude at Boris


Johnson’s difficulties: with the Delta (Indian) variant, a possible Scots-led break-up of the UK, DUP hardline utterrances on the Good Friday Agreement, and the alignment of Joe Biden with


European positions rather than English Brexit ones. It would be too early to write off Marine Le Pen, but the anti-European populist moment may have passed. Viktor Orban is seen more and


more as a hateful homophobe, with the Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, openly calling on Hungary to quit the EU. In Germany, the racist and Europhobe AfD is not growing in support. Instead,


the Greens, who have shaped a green populism over 25 years, are looking like probable governing partners in post-Merkel Germany. The German Greens are proving themselves sensible managers


in Land and big city governments. So while the SPD suffers the fate of other classic 20th century political formations, progressive and non-ideological politics is re-emerging in new forms.


Macron, for example, is as tough on Islamist ideology as anyone who writes for Policy Exchange or the _Spectator_ might wish. The Danish Social Democratic-led government is reported to be


cooperating with Home Secretary Priti Patel on opening processing centres for economic migrants, who pay people traffickers to be brought to Calais to embark on rubber dinghies and head for


Dover. The Danish social democrats lost power 20 years ago when they refused to listen to voters’ concerns on immigration. They now ban marriages between a Dane and a non-EU citizen under


the age of 24. This is the new post-ideological style of winning power in Europe. It picks bits and pieces of populism, but incorporates them into wider political projects with strong


elements of social investment to help the left-behinds, who were ignored in the long Thatcherite or neo-liberal era and at Davos gatherings of the super-rich and their fawning politicians.


Identity politics has been taken on board by more and more mainstream parties across Europe, who support regional and sub-national identities — in contrast to the southern English elite’s


disdain for Scotland and its quest for respect for the Scottish nation. Hardly anywhere does one single party rule exclusively in the manner of Boris Johnson’s Brexitised Tory party.


Coalitions, arrangements, agreements, power-sharing, holding office for two years and then giving way to other leaders are the new norm in European politics (and beyond, e.g. in Israel) in


the third decade of the new century. The resignation of Sweden’s Social Democratic Prime Minister Stefan Löfven, just announced today, is a case in point. Löfven headed a heterogeneous


minority coalition that lost a confidence vote in parliament — a first for Sweden. Löfven now has to see if he can form a new government or give another party leader a chance. But the


populist, hard-Right Swedish Democrats, once crudely racist, have had to tone down their extremism if their leader, Jimmie Åkesson, hopes even to enter a coalition, let alone form one. The


price of power is pragmatic compromise, as rank populism won’t work. Populism is based on the Führerprinzip – like Erdogan in Turkey or Orban in Hungary. But even Orban is now facing serious


opposition from a broad-based coalition like the one that brought down Netanyahu in Israel. Meanwhile, Boris Johnson’s populism has so far turned out to be based on social democratic tax,


borrow and spend largesse. Thus the term “populist”, which was so modish between 2010 and 2020, has run out of use in the era of Biden, the end of an all-embracing European project, and the


patchwork of parties that form most of today’s European governments. The professors will have to find a new describer for post-populist politics. A MESSAGE FROM THEARTICLE _We are the only


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