The iran crisis — this is only the beginning | thearticle

Iran’s launch of 16 missiles against bases used by US troops in Iraq on Wednesday was the concluding ceremony in Qasem Soleimani’s funeral. It was even called “Operation Martyr Soleimani”

and it followed immediately at the end of official mourning and the burial of his remains. The Qiam-1 and Conqueror-313s were powerful ballistic missiles, but they carried relatively small

warheads and at least four of them failed in-flight, missing their target in Irbil. The 11 missiles that struck the al-Asad base in Anbar province did small damage and caused no casualties.

The Iranians had ensured that the US was tipped off about the targets in advance. And since the US had communicated very, very privately to Iranian leaders that if their necessary

retaliation was limited, the US would live with that, it seems that Tehran had got the message. So by Thursday everyone could claim satisfaction. Iranian TV boasted that at least 80

Americans had been killed and hundreds injured. And President Trump, only a shade less disingenuously, claimed that his decision to assassinate Soleimani had been entirely vindicated, and

added that those missiles fired against American troops “were paid for with the funds made available by the last administration,” just to increase the apoplexy of senior Democrats. So: one

Iranian senior commander dead, over 50 mourners trampled to death at his funeral, 176 innocent people killed on Ukrainian airlines flight PS752, mistakenly shot down in a tragic Iranian

military accident, and no US casualties anywhere — what next? While Foreign Minister Zarif’s statement after the missile strikes was intended to draw a line under tit-for-tat aerial attacks,

Ayatollah Khamenei’s statement a couple of hours later made it clear that this was only the end of phase one. US Vice President Mike Pence reported optimistically that the US had

information that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had instructed its various regional militias not to attack American forces in other parts of the Middle East. But they would say

that wouldn’t they? There is absolutely no evidence that the IRGC intends to change a _modus operandi _that goes back to 1979. It is just plausible that the IRGC might be cautious in the

coming weeks about provoking outright US attacks on Iranian targets, but it would be a big stretch to think that the strategy had changed. So what is at stake that might account for Iran’s

willingness to de-escalate, at least this week? In short, it is almost certainly because Iranian leaders think they are now well-placed to achieve some long-term aims in the region and

beyond. Ferocious Iranian counter-strikes would be a sign of enraged weakness; while a degree of “strategic patience” indicates confidence. The accidental downing of PS752 is a major

international setback for the Iranian government and a source of deep embarrassment to it. Nevertheless, in the longer term, the Iranians know they have something to be more confident about,

both in the Middle East and in the wider court of world opinion, if they can somehow get over the PS752 tragedy in reasonable shape. Tehran’s most immediate interests lie in neighbouring

Iraq. Iranian leaders have repeatedly said that they want to see the back of all US influence in Iraq as a first step to getting the US out of the Middle East altogether. They will not have

to work very hard to make the continued presence of American and other allied forces in Iraq very uncomfortable in the months to come. Tehran effectively controls Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation

Units (PMU) — the collective organisation of Shia militias that fought alongside US and Kurdish forces to defeat the ISIS’s “caliphate” after 2014. With all Western troops now hunkered down

in their bases for the foreseeable future, it will not be difficult for Tehran to ensure the PMU poses a risk if they emerge to resume their work. It can render them superfluous and reduce

them to little more than potential targets, protecting themselves. Nor will it be difficult for Tehran to keep pressuring Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi to move to a negotiated, but

rapid, withdrawal arrangement for US troops. It is, after all, what President Trump has repeatedly said he wants. It is just that he cannot countenance the loss of political influence that

would go with it, and at a time when ISIS sleeper cells are emerging from the power vacuum created across the border in northern Syria by the President’s own on/off military pull-out, and

when IS activity is growing again in northern Iraq. To get the US “out” of Iraq in some meaningful way would be a major strategic win for Tehran and there is a clear path ahead of them to

achieve this. If US forces leave Iraq, it is impossible to believe that 400 British, and the very small numbers of German, Danish, Norwegian, Polish, Finnish and Slovakian forces also

in-country, would remain there for very long. And if Tehran believes that the US presence in Iraq is now on the skids, it also believes that it is in a good position to wage its “war of

strategic communications” in the wider world. Since the assassination of Soleimani, Iranian rulers have sought to behave in a way that has shown their deep hurt, but they have been careful,

graduated in their response — almost legalistic. They know that most other governments in the world think US actions were foolish, if not shocking. They know that the Democrats are furious

over Trump’s actions and justifications for them. They can see that America’s European allies are struggling to find the right words in reaction to events of the week, but are moving

steadily against the US position in practical terms. Nato has reportedly “signed up” to take a greater counter-terrorist role alongside the US in Iraq, but in truth, there is precious little

the alliance can do beyond more training — and that is all at a standstill. Tehran believes there is a lot to play for in isolating the Trump administration over its Middle East policies

with some carefully calculated acts of political theatre that can make the most of spontaneous events as they arise. Meanwhile, the “E3” European powers — France, Germany and Britain — will

be going through their own political theatre. They will likely keep trying to differentiate themselves from this particular US policy strand, while calling for calm, dialogue and

de-escalation. This, too, will be more for domestic consumption, since there is almost nothing the E3 can do to affect the situation in the Levant one way or the other. They might provide

their good offices for future communications and negotiations, but in themselves, they have no meaningful influence with either Washington or Tehran in this particular conflict; none at all

with Damascus, very little with Baghdad and marginal influence only with Tel Aviv. One of the most significant pointers to the future is that they also have no power to influence Moscow’s

policy in the region. President Putin made an unscheduled visit to Damascus this week. The Chinese Foreign Minister turned up unexpectedly in Baghdad. The E3 made phone calls. The tragedy of

Flight PS752 provides a nasty twist at this stage of the crisis as the evidence became all but conclusive on Thursday that Iranian air defences had brought the aircraft down in error. This

“internationalises” the crisis again in bringing in the angry interests of Ukraine, Canada and some of the other countries, including Britain, whose nationals were killed aboard the

airliner. Iran has remained evasive and denied the growing forensic evidence of its Gauntlet SAM missile mistake, but it will have to face the emerging truth very soon, if it is not to lose

some of the grudging credit it had with global public opinion up until Wednesday morning. As with most international crises, events tend to set off an undercurrent of dynamic change —

difficult for anyone to control — even when the major protagonists think they may be pausing for reflection, or even just for a breath.