Is there more to trump’s middle east peace plan than meets the eye? | thearticle

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The past 25 years have witnessed six failed attempts by three US presidents, to broker a peace agreement between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. Donald Trump’s latest plan looks just


as likely as its predecessor in failing to bring about its stated objective of peace. Trump’s proposal is heavily sided toward Israel and was rejected by the Palestinians before it was even


announced. Nonetheless, the plan is far more important than most commentators are prepared to concede. Its importance lies not just in what it says, but in how it has been received beyond


Israel and the Palestinian territories. It highlights the realities of Middle Eastern politics today. Within Israel the plan has received bipartisan support and whether the Palestinians


accept it or not, the proposed deal is likely to shape the future contours of debate. The plan’s reception is historic because, for the first time since the start of the Arab-Israeli


conflict, the position of several key Arab states has not simply been a carbon copy of the Palestinian position. This is especially notable, as never before has a US peace plan attempted to


impose resolution on so-called “final status” issues, such as Jerusalem, the Palestinian right of return and Israel’s final boundaries — rather than leaving the two parties to resolve these


most problematic issues at a later date. The paradox is that while this makes Israeli-Palestinian peace less likely, the initial response by influential Arab states was not outright


rejection, but to urge the Palestinians to use the deal as a starting point for negotiations. In other words, tacit acceptance of Israel, leaving aside their traditional insistence on a


negotiated solution based on boundary lines in existence before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In so doing, they were acknowledging a broader truth; de facto Arab-Israeli peace in the face of


common cause against Iran. Bahrain, Oman and the UAE sent their ambassadors to the Washington launch, while Egypt and Saudi Arabia reacted by effectively calling for the start of negotiation


without overtly supporting the plan. This was hardly a public triumph, followed as it was by outright condemnation last week by the Arab League. But it does illustrate how the


Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been demoted in the list of regional priorities. To put it another way, a whole range of issues such as Iran, Libya, Syria, ties to the US, and indeed


military ties to Israel, are now considered of such great importance that much of the Arab world has settled into co-existence with Israel. Trump’s assassination of Qasem Soleimani at the


start of the year, may have been met with incredulity and condemnation in the West, but it has also solidified America’s position in the Middle East with her Arab allies. Before the strike,


US regional commitment had been questioned in the wake of Trump’s stated desire to draw down military force in the region and apparent willingness to cede decisive involvement in Syria to


Russia and Iran. In acting decisively against Iran, Trump is again perceived as the best defence against Iranian adventurism. Arab leaders are engaged in a balancing act between Trump’s


peace deal and making sure Palestinian anger does not result in the further strengthening of Iranian proxies in Gaza. The Trump plan appears designed to exert maximum pressure on the


Palestinians and not just in ensuring wide-ranging Arab acquiescence with the deal. Trump’s plan solidifies “facts on the ground” and in so doing redraws the boundaries of politically


acceptable debate in the US for both Republicans and Democrats. For instance, future US presidents are likely to find it hard to reverse Trump’s decision to recognise Jerusalem as Israel’s


capital. So too, future presidential candidates might find Trump’s more limited definition of “Palestinian refugee” useful, as it could ease Israeli concerns about the right of return.


Reversing prior presidential policy would require a personality of the same recklessness as Trump himself. The effects can already be seen. Some of the Democratic presidential candidates,


such as Peter Buttigieg and Elizabeth Warren, have spoken of their disapproval of Israeli annexation without proposing any plans to stop it, engaging instead in a rhetorical sleight of hand.


What Trump proposes is not peace by negotiation, as we may have come to expect, but rather peace through sufferance. It seems that many Arab leaders share his view of the changing


imperatives of the region since the Oslo Peace Accords were signed. These dynamics have only accelerated in the past decade. Palestinian leaders may never be persuaded to change their views


on Israel’s existence, the injustice of their situation or indeed the injustice of the universe of possible deals to which Israel would also acquiesce. It does remain possible that the


Palestinian peoples’ dire political and humanitarian circumstances will mean that they see negotiation, using this deal as a starting point, however unsatisfactory, as the best available


option at the moment.