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The latest serpentine twist of the Brexit drama suggests that a deal is back on the agenda for next week’s European Council. While Boris Johnson was tight-lipped after the Merseyside
mini-summit, his Irish counterpart was cockahoop. Leo Varadkar evidently feels that he has extracted enough concessions to feel confident of selling a deal to his domestic audience and, even
more importantly, his EU colleagues. While it is pointless to speculate about the viability of the deal until concrete details emerge, it is not too soon to think about the possible
political consequences if it can be hammered out in time for Brexit to take place at the end of the month. There are two dimensions to these consequences, British and European. Let us
consider the British outlook first. The first question is: how will a deal play in Parliament? The fragile Opposition coalition is likely to disintegrate. Most former Conservative rebels
will settle for almost any deal. So will a substantial number of Labour MPs, and although Jeremy Corbyn will probably find fault with any deal that has Boris Johnson’s name on it, he may
finally be forced to choose between acquiescence or defeat. The Liberal Democrats and SNP will oppose any form of Brexit, but they are not strong enough to block it. As for the DUP: they
will hate any conceivable deal, but will be wary of being blamed for scuppering something that Boris Johnson will present as a fair deal for unionists. They may abstain but are unlikely to
vote against it. The really interesting question arises after the deal passes the parliamentary hurdles. Boris will immediately demand an election — and he may even get one. But what will be
the effect of a deal, with all the messy compromises that it will inevitably involve, on the Brexit Party and its voters? This is where the Prime Minister will require every ounce of charm
and eloquence that he can muster. Nigel Farage will denounce the deal as a sellout; he has no choice but to do so. But the Leave-voting public may, for once, feel that more than half a loaf
is better than no Brexit at all. Boris Johnson needs only half of the Brexit Party’s voters to abandon the Faragist cause. Once it becomes clear that this is likely to happen, splits will
open up in the new party’s fissiparous alliance of former Tories, Ukip diehards and the “none of the above” brigade. Under the relentless barrage of seductive propaganda that Dominic
Cummings may be relied on to produce, the hardliners will begin to crack and Boris Johnson will assemble a new coalition of Brexiteers while pivoting to the centre ground. Meanwhile, in
Europe the prospect of an “orderly” Brexit will be greeted with relief by all but those who are invested in squeezing the British until the pips squeak. Michel Barnier is one of those who
relishes penalising the Tories in the hope of producing a more amenable regime in London. Yet despite their differences, highlighted earlier this week in that notorious phone call, Angela
Merkel would far rather face Boris Johnson across the table than Jeremy Corbyn. Her view is shared by most, if not all, of the other 26 leaders. The prospect of a deal could, therefore, lead
to a surprising outbreak of peace between the cross-Channel antagonists. Such a rapprochement might not last long, once the post-Brexit negotiations on the knotty problems of the long-term
political settlement come to the fore. But there is at least a chance that the UK and the EU will observe a Christmas truce. We can only hope that all will be quiet on the Western front for
long enough to celebrate the end of an unlamented chapter in our island story.