How brussels has been getting boris (and britain) wrong for thirty years | thearticle

The atmosphere in Brussels is fevered as the Eurocrats sort out the results of the European election before heading off for their inviolate _vacances d’__été. _Far from the British

caricature of a long-lunching, secretary-chasing culture, the institutions of the European Union are surprisingly spry and focused in the hot months of June and July. Chef de Cabinets are

booking 7am meetings for the big personalities of the EU to clear lingering issues. Espresso-fuelled _fonctionaires _are holding all-nighters, drafting punchy internal memoranda with gutsy

political judgements that oil the machine. And Eurocrat families are readying the Mercedes for imminent departure to the Mediterranean coast. It is humbling to admit, but at its best the

Rond Point Schuman has a focused, electric energy that makes Westminster feel like an eccentric provincial capital. It is therefore surprising to hear about the hand-wringing acclimatisation

to Boris’s impending victory in the Conservative leadership election and his likely entry to Downing Street after PMQs on Wednesday July 24. “Officials who had dealings with Mr Johnson —

now the favourite to become Britain’s next prime minister — say he played a central role in changing perceptions about the bloc,” says the _Financial Times_, in a piece that agonises over

Boris’s time as the _Daily Telegraph_’s Brussels correspondent 1989-94. The angst is palpable. They do not quite put it like this. But the question appears to be: how did this buffoon —

famous in the 1990s for fake news about bendy bananas, prawn-flavoured crisps and the great British banger — become the Prime Minister who is set to take Britain out of the EU? I would offer

three challenges to this question. And one major recommendation. I spent 1991 working as a _“__stagi__ère__” _(intern) in the press office of the European Commission, in the critical year

of preparation for the Single European Act, when momentarily everything seemed to be about Europe. My life was all about sorting out paperwork for press conferences with trading partners,

gossiping over moules-frites about bust-ups between Jacques Delors and Leon Brittan, and sexy Euro-parties with Nick Clegg. The idea that everyone dismissed the antics of the British

Eurosceptic press is quite wrong. My memory is that the whole Berlaymont building was obsessed by Boris: at every dinner party the talk was largely about “Boris” (as he was already known)

and his ilk. Understanding of the British media was very subtle. The Eurocrats knew exactly what he was doing. They just didn’t like to take his attacks seriously, because it would mean

changing their approach. Where Eurocrats made a mistake — and they continue to make it — is that they exaggerated the importance of Boris the individual, and massively overlookedthe

entrenched and strategically sophisticated organisation of the Eurosceptics, mainly in the UK, but also across Europe. There was a reluctance to admit that Eurosceptics are anything more

than a cranky, marginal part of the vote, and that it does not necessarily settle down at around 30 per cent of the electorate in many countries, as recent votes demonstrate. There was a

reluctance to admit that Euroscepticism exists outside Britain, whereas it has always been quite prevalent across the Continent too, as witnessed by the recent European Parliament elections.

And there was a reluctance to admit that anyone in the business community, beyond a few snobbish City of London hedge-funders, might have serious, thoughtful concerns about the European

project. In an act of collective displacement, they piled their resentments on Boris, who made a career out of his notoriety. In 1990s Brussels, when asked about Boris by puzzled European

friends, if you said that he merely reflected the attitudes of many people in Britain, and elsewhere, you were thrown out of the conversation. And, rather than engage with the challenge of

Eurosceptic populism, EU leaders poured petrol on the flames with their own behaviour, their language and, it pains me to say, their culture of arrogance. A more engaging piece than the FT’s

why-oh-why, would have asked whether some officials in Brussels greatly regret the fact they didn’t take popular Euroscepticism more seriously, and are now looking at ways of addressing the

issue. But I am not sure that’s true of many Eurocrats. Where, for instance, is the reforming agenda? After the 2008 economic crash, where was the soul-searching and the re-boot? In

Britain,the EU’s succession of crises led to the Bloomberg speech in 2013 and David Cameron’s failed efforts to kick-start a reform process. But in Brussels they kept pushing on with

integration. As a result, populist Euroscepticism has taken root, and is tinged with a distasteful and dangerous nationalist, far-right dimension. In the last European Parliament elections,

there was relief that these populists did not sweep the board, as some feared. But we should be under no illusion. They are now deeply entrenched in the mainstream of Europe’s parliamentary,

media and civic life. The political tone in Europe is strongly affected by nationalist, right-wing, Eurosceptic and populist parties: Italy’s Five Star Movement and The League, Germany’s

Alternative for Germany, Hungary’s Fidesz, Spain’s Vox, Austria’s Freedom Party, France’s National Front, Sweden’s Democrats, Finland’s True Finns, Estonia’s People’s Party, Slovenia’s

Democratic Party, and Holland’s Forum for Democracy. And, of course, Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party. I see a clear red thread from Boris’s prawn-flavoured crisps to the challenge of right-wing

nationalism in Europe. And the connection is not Boris. After all, he’s spent the intervening years trying to be a liberal mayor of London. The connection is the consistent failure of the

European institutions to face up to the challenge of populist Euroscepticism. And it all started twenty-five years ago.